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I. INTRODUCTION
The body of law surrounding search and arrest is well developed. However,
because a seizure is usually the natural by-product of a search, or is otherwise
justified under the plain view doctrine, "pure" property seizure law is not well
developed. Consequently, "pure" property seizures have not received much attention,
and the term "seizure" has not been clearly defined. Most law school graduates can
recite the definition of "search"; how many can recite the definition of "seizure"?
** Judge Advocate, United States Army. Presently assigned as the Senior Defense
Counsel, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. J.D., 2001, University of California, Los Angeles; L.L.M.,
2005, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia
(Commandant's List, Judge Paul W. Brosman Award for Criminal Law); B.A. 1993, University of
California, Berkeley (with distinction). Member of the California and the District of Columbia bars,
and admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States. Author of Book Review,
ARMY LAW, June 2005, at 48. Email: eric.r.carpenter@us.army.mil. The views expressed in this
article are the author's alone and do not represent any official position by the United States Army.
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
As Professor Wayne LaFave notes, "The word 'seizure' in the Fourth
Amendment has, in the main, not been a source of difficulty."' But consider the
following hypothetical: imagine federal agents think that an American of Saudi
Arabian descent has ties to a terrorist organization. The man takes a package to a
shipping store, with an outbound address to Yemen. He leaves the store, and a federal
agent, with the consent of the shipping store, takes the package to her office to
investigate the shipping address, all without having a reasonable suspicion that the
man was engaged in any criminal activity. The agent then returns the package before
the truck that would have shipped the package departs. Did the officer's actions
amount to a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment? If the officer
had eventually found some evidence in this package, would that evidence be
admissible in court?
Under the definition of a property seizure found in United States v. Jacobsen,
3
and under the model for analyzing property seizures that has been developed by some
lower federal courts using this approach,4 the agent did not seize the package, and the
evidence comes in. The Jacobsen model addresses two questions: 1) has there been a
seizure?; and 2) if there has been a seizure, was the seizure reasonable in inception
and scope? 5 The Jacobsen Court defined a property seizure to be the government's
meaningful interference with a person's possessory interest in an item.6  This
definition for "seizure" is a term of art-it includes a threshold requirement for
government activity before a person's possessory interest in an item becomes
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, what might appear to a layperson to be a
"seizure," like the agent taking someone's package, is not a "seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Under this definition, a broad range of government conduct is beyond judicial
scrutiny. Generally, the government has not meaningfully interfered with a person's
possessory interest unless a government agent takes the item directly from the person
or somehow interferes with the person's liberty interests (say, by causing the item to
not be there when the person goes to pick it up, thereby disrupting the person's
travel).7 If the government has not meaningfully interfered with this possessory
1. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzURE: A TREATISE ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT §
2.1(a) (4th ed. 2004).
2. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
3. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 144 E3d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v.
England, 971 E2d 419, 420 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Lovell, 849 F.2d 910, 915 (5th Cir.
1988); United States v. Quiroz, 57 E Supp. 2d 805, 813 (D. Minn. 1999); United States v. Wood, 6 E
Supp. 2d 1213, 1224 (D. Kan. 1998); United States v. Visser, 40 M.J. 86, 90 (C.M.A. 1994).
5. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
7. See discussion infra Part IVC.
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interest, then the Fourth Amendment provides no protection. Consequently, the
government's actions may not receive judicial review.
In the hypothetical, the agent did not take the package directly from the citizen.
Further, because the agent did not otherwise meaningfully interfere with the citizen's
liberty interest in the package by, say, delaying the citizen's receipt of the package on
the other end, the agent did not "seize" the package. Therefore, without even having
reasonable suspicion, under the Jacobsen model, the agent could have taken the
package from the store, and her actions would not have received judicial review.8
Another model for seizures exists and competes with the Jacobsen model in the
lower federal courts. This model derives from Terry v. Ohio9 and United States v.
Place.'° The Terry and Place Courts addressed three basic questions: 1) is there a
constitutionally protected interest?; 2) did the government interfere with that interest?;
and 3) was that interference reasonable at inception and in scope?" The first two
questions amount to Fourth Amendment triggers and, when joined, serve as the
definition of seizure: a seizure occurs when the government interferes with a liberty
or property interest.12
The Terry and Place Courts confirmed that the Constitution protects all liberty
and property interests,13 and both the Terry and Place Courts found that any
government interference with those constitutionally protected rights triggers Fourth
Amendment analysis. 14 A combination of these two Fourth Amendment triggers-a
constitutionally protected interest and government interference with that interest-is
how the Terry Court defined a liberty seizure: when a police officer, through means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the person's liberty.'
5
Likewise, the Place Court defined a property seizure to be: when the government, for
its own purposes, exercises dominion and control over property in which the person
has a possessory interest. 16 Under these definitions, a broad range of government
conduct falls within judicial review.
The Terry and Place approach to defining seizures is the common-sense
approach. Either a person has a protected interest or the person does not; and either
8. Under the Jacobsen model, if the government has "seized" the item, the courts then
conduct a reasonableness inquiry. The seizure must be reasonable at inception (supported by at least
a reasonable suspicion) and reasonable in scope (if supported by reasonable suspicion, limited to
those courses of action that will quickly confirm or dispel the government's suspicion). See
discussion infra Part IVB.
9. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
11. See discussion infra Part III.A.
12. See discussion infra Part 1ll.A
13. See discussion infra Part VB.
14. See discussion infra Parts 11-IMI.
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. See discussion infra Part II.
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the government has interfered with that interest or the government has not. Lay
people can understand that when they are no longer free to leave, the government has
interfered with their liberty interests and has "seized" them. In addition, lay people
can understand that when the government has taken control of their property to
conduct a criminal investigation, the government has infringed on their possessory
interests and has "seized" their property.
Returning to the hypothetical, but this time using the Terry and Place approach, a
different outcome is achieved. First, the citizen had a possessory interest in his
package. The agent interfered with that interest when she exercised dominion and
control over the package (she took it to her office) for her own purposes (to conduct a
limited criminal investigation). Her interference with his protected interest amounts
to a "seizure," the Fourth Amendment applies, and her actions will receive judicial
scrutiny.
After deciding that a seizure occurred, both the Terry and Place Courts examined
the reasonableness of the seizure. 17 The reasonableness inquiry examined both the
reasonableness of the seizure at its inception and the reasonableness of its scope.
Inception deals with what the government must know before seizing an item, and
scope deals with what the government can do after seizing an item. Under both Terry
and Place, at inception, the government could justify brief seizures with reasonable
suspicion, but needed to justify intrusive seizures with probable cause. Both Courts
placed scope limitations on reasonable suspicion seizures. Under Terry, the scope is
narrow, and where liberty interests are directly impacted, the government must move
quickly to confirm or dispel its suspicions.' 8 Under Place, the allowable scope can
vary relative to how burdensome the seizure is on the person's possessory interests.1 9
If the burden is slight, the government will have more latitude on the length of delay.
If the burden is more substantial (for example, a corresponding limit on the person's
freedom of movement), then the government must limit its actions to those necessary
to quickly confirm or dispel its suspicions.
Under Place, a seizure occurs when there is any government interference of a
possessory interest in property.20 The degree of intrusiveness is a factor when
determining the allowable scope of that seizure and not in determining whether a
seizure occurred in the first place. However, under the Jacobsen model, a seizure
occurs only when there is a meaningful government interference with a possessory
interest in property. Significantly, the Jacobsen model moves the "degree of
interference" factor from the scope inquiry into the definition of seizure itself. Thus,
back to the hypothetical, under Place, the agent had seized the citizen's package and
so had to have a reasonable suspicion to do so; but under Jacobsen, she did not
17. See discussion infra Parts 11-IH.
18. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
19. Place, 462 U.S. at 709.
20. Id. at 708.
21. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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meaningfully interfere with the citizen's possessory interest, did not "seize" the
package, and so could take it even without having a reasonable suspicion to do so.
22
Despite the strengths of the Place model and the flaws in the Jacobsen model,
commentators,23 horn book authors,24 and even the Supreme Court (in cases not
requiring actual application of the definition)25 agree with the Jacobsen definition of
seizure. Lower federal courts are split between the models, with some applying the
Place model26 and some applying the Jacobsen model.2 7 Of more concern, some
appellate courts have reached different results on similar fact patterns. 28 This split
among the lower federal courts creates the opportunity for the Supreme Court to
resolve the confusion by deciding that the Place model is the correct approach for
property seizure analysis.
Section H reviews Terry and examines the framework it established for seizures
of people. Section III turns to Place (and United States v. Van Leeuwen,29 a prelude
to Place) and finds that the Place framework derives from and parallels the
framework created under Terry for the seizure of persons.30  Section V examines
Jacobsen and discovers that,- although it announced a defmition for seizures, it
applied the Place framework when deciding the case. The focus is then placed on a
22. Id. at 121.
23. See Mary Kim, Investigation and Police Practices: Overview of the Fourth
Amendment, 90 GEO. L.J. 1099, 1105-06 (2002) (citing the Jacobsen language as the definition of
seizure); David S. Rudstein, "Touchy" "Feely"--s There a Constitutional Diference? The
Constitutionality of "Prepping" a Passenger s Luggage for a Human or Canine Sniffafter Bond v.
United States, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 191,201 (2001) (citing the Jacobsen language as the definition of
seizure); Antonio Yanez, Jr., Ayeni v. Mottola and the Implications of Characterizing Videotaping as
a Fourth Amendment Seizure, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 507, 518 (1995) (using the Jacobsen model to
analyze the issue of commercial cameramen accompanying police officers into suspects' homes).
24. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.02(A) (3d ed. 2002);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARcH AND SEIzuRE: A TREAnsE ON THE FOuRTH AMENDMENT § 2.1 (a) (4th ed.
2004).
25. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324
(1987); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463,469 (1985).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 601, 603 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Glover, 104 E3d 1570, 1576-77 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Allen, 990 F.2d 667, 671 (1st Cir.
1993); United States v. Banks, 3 E3d 399, 401 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Aldaz, 921 F. 2d
227,229 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lux, 905 F2d 1379,1382 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v.
LaFrance, 879 E2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Martinez, 869 F. Supp. 202, 205 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
27. United States v. Conley, 856 F. Supp. 1010, 1018 (W.D. Pa. 1994); State v. Weekley, 27
P. 3d 325,328 (Ariz. App. 2001).
28. Compare Johnson, 171 F.3d at 605-06 (reversing a conviction after finding that the
initial seizure-setting aside mail for a drug sniff-was not supported by reasonable suspicion) with
United States v. Lovell, 849 F2d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding a conviction after finding that
the initial detention-setting aside luggage for a drug sniff-did not trigger constitutional scrutiny).
29. 397 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1970).
30. Place, 462 U.S. at 708.
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lower federal court's application of the Jacobsen definition to fully develop the
Jacobsen model.
Section V explores the problems with the Jacobsen model: its definition for
"seizure" does not find support in Terry or Place-the cases that authorized
reasonable suspicion seizures of persons and property in the first place; the Jacobsen
model places too much police conduct beyond constitutional scrutiny, a result that
neither the Terry nor Place Courts would have accepted; and when put to the test, the
Jacobsen framework has limited usefulness. It is then noted that the Place model is
consistent with Terry and with traditional search analysis, and that the Place model
ensures that the initial stages of contact between citizen and government agent remain
under judicial scrutiny, thereby protecting citizens from potential abuses. Further, if
courts are concerned that the Place model will exclude too much relevant evidence,
these courts can alleviate their concerns by liberally construing what constitutes
reasonable suspicion.
Hl. AREvmw oF TERRY V OHIO
Before turning to the Court's analysis in Place, a review of the case that serves
as its foundation, Terry v. Ohio,3 1 is proper. In Terry, an experienced policeman
32observed three men (one of whom was Terry) who appeared to be casing a store.
The officer approached the men and asked for their names; when they mumbled
some responses, the officer spun Terry around and then patted down Terry's clothing,
discovering a gun.3 Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.34
The Court dealt with two issues: the initial stop and the subsequent frisky. The
government argued that the officer's initial actions (when he grabbed Terry, spun him
around, and patted him down) did not amount to a "seizure" or "search" that would
36trigger the Fourth Amendment. The government argued that a stop and frisk only
amounted to a "minor inconvenience and petty indignity. ' 37  Essentially, the
government asked the Court to treat "seizure" and "search" as terms of art. 8 By this
reasoning, any government interference with a protected interest that amounted to no
more than a minor inconvenience and petty indignity would fall outside of the
constitutional definition of seizure and search.3 9 The appellant asked the Court to
31. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
32. Id. at 5-6.
33. Id. at 6-7.
34. Id. at8.
35. Id at 15.
36. Id. at 10.
37. Id. at 10 (quoting People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y 2d 441, 447 (1964)).
38. Id. at 10.
39. Id. at 10-11.
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apply the common-sense definitions of the terms,4 0 under which the police conduct
would constitute a seizure and search. If the Court accepted the appellant's argument,
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis would require the government to support the
officer's actions with full-blown probable cause, which under these facts, the officer
did not have.41
The Court collectively described the parties' approach to the problem as "all-or-
nothing. '42 Either the police conduct did not amount to a search and seizure, and the
Fourth Amendment did not apply; or the police conduct did amount to a search and
seizure, and the government must provide probable cause.43 Recognizing the value
of this police conduct, the Court was unwilling to require that police have probable
cause before conducting a stop and frisk.44  However, the Court rejected the
temptation to turn the definitions of "seizure" and "search" into terms of art, stating
"There was some suggestion in the use of such terms as 'stop' and 'frisk' that such
police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment because neither
action rises to the level of a 'search' or 'seizure' within the meaning of the
Constitution. We emphatically reject [that] notion.' 4 5 Instead, the Court took the
middle ground, declaring that the police conduct was a seizure and search, but was of
the sort that did not require probable cause.
Next, the Court pointed out that a constitutionally protected interest was
involved, as "[n]o right is held more sacred.., than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person... ,,46 Having identified the protected
interest, the Court turned to whether the government had interfered with that
interest4 7 The Court had little difficulty deciding that the officer's conduct interfered
with Terry's liberty interest and, therefore, constituted a seizure: "It is quite plain that
the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a
trip to the station house... [W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.
' 48
The Court used a common-sense definition of seizure, finding that a seizure of a
person occurs when "the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. ' 49 Further, the Court described any
government restraint or interference with a person's liberty, however slight, as
constituting a seizure: "[T]he Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of
40. Id. at 11-12.
41. Id. at 7-8.
42. Id. at 17.
43. State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 120, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 130 (1966).
44. Tery, 392 U.S. at 22-23, 26-27.
45. Id. at 16 (emphasis added) (internal footnotes omitted).
46. Id at 9 (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,251 (1891)).
47. Id. at 9.
48. Id. at 16.
49. Id at 19 n.16.
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the public upon personal security. ' '50 This is an absolute right to be "free from all
restraint and interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law,''51 even if this conduct only amounts to a "minor inconvenience and petty
indignity."" Thus, the Court emphatically rejected the idea that, for there to be a
seizure, the government must meaningfully interfere with a person's liberty interest.53
Having decided that this police conduct was a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, the Court turned to the reasonableness of the seizure, both at its
inception and in its scope.54 The Court weighed the government interests against the
intrusion on individual rights and decided these types of seizures are reasonable at
inception if the agent can articulate a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
55
Applying this test, the Court found the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the men
were casing a store.
56
The Court then focused on the scope of these reasonable suspicion seizures5 7 and
decided that the government should limit its actions to those "reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.,, 58 Here,
the justifying circumstances (the suspect's suspicious behavior) would allow for the
officer to take those steps which were "minimally necessary" to dispel those
59
suspicions. On the facts before it, the Court found the officer's actions were
necessary to quickly confirm or dispel those suspicions, and so affirmed the
conviction.
60
Looking back at the Terry opinion, it is clear that the Court used the following
analytical framework. First, the Court found that there was a protected interest,
liberty. Second, the Court found that the government interfered with that interest.
62
With those two triggers satisfied, the Fourth Amendment applied and the government
had seized the person.63  Finally, the Court required that the seizure be reasonable,
50. Teny, 392 U.S. at 18 n.15 (emphasis added).
51. Id at 9 (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 257 (1891)) (emphasis
added).
52. Id. at 10.
53. Likewise, the Court rejected the idea that a frisk was not a search: "And it is nothing
less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer
surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a
'search."' Id. at 16.
54. Id. at 19-20.
55. Id at 22-25, 27.
56. Id at 27-28.
57. Id at 19.
58. Id at20.
59. Id. at 30.
60. Id at 26-27, 29-31.
61. Id. at9.
62. Id. at 9-10.
63. Id. at 16.
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both at inception (a reasonable, articulable suspicion for temporary seizures or
probable cause for arrest-type seizures) and in scope (the government must limit its
actions to those necessary to quickly confirm or dispel those suspicions).64
In its analysis, the Court spotted a serious danger embedded within the term of
art approach to defining seizure. The court explained, "[This approach] seeks to
isolate from constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the
policeman and the citizen. ''65 Had the Court decided that these government actions
did not constitute a "seizure," a whole class of police behavior would be placed
beyond constitutional scrutiny.66 Police could use a show of force to stop any citizen
at any time for any reason, without even having a reasonable suspicion that the citizen
was engaged in criminal activity.67 By rejecting the term of art approach, the Court
refused to give the police such broad authority to interfere with the liberty of
citizens.68
Additionally, the Court recognized another peril in adopting a term of art
approach in that it could not place any scope limitations on reasonable suspicion
seizures.69 A term of art approach, which resulted in an "all-or-nothing model," did
not allow for middle ground-it choked off the potential for reasonable suspicion
seizures. The Court explained that the all-or-nothing model "obscures the utility of
limitations upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police actions as a means of
constitutional regulation.' 70  The Court was willing to allow the government to
71perform these seizures, but with scope restrictions.
It will be shown that the Place model remains consistent with the Terry model.
In contrast, the Jacobsen model turns the definition of property seizure into a term of
art, thereby accepting the two perils that the Terry Court identified.
III. The Place Model
Because of the relatively narrow set of circumstances in which a pure property
seizure may be controversial, the Supreme Court did not directly tackle pure property
seizures until 1983, when it decided United States v. Place.72 Place involved a canine
64. Id at 15-16. For a graphical representation of this model, see infra App. A.
65. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
66. Id. at 17.
67. Id. at 19.
68. Id. at 16-17.
69. Id. at 17-18.
70. Id. at 17 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
71. Id. at 19.
72. 462 U.S. 696, 700-01 (1983) (recognizing that it faced a new issue, the Court stated,
"Although in the context of personal property, and particularly containers, the Fourth Amendment
challenge is typically to the subsequent search of the container than to its initial seizure by the
authorities, our cases reveal some general principles regarding seizures"). Granted, in 1970, just two
years after Terry, the Court touched on pure property seizures in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397
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sniff of a person's luggage.73 Place aroused the suspicion of law enforcement agents
while he was waiting in line at the Miami airport to board a flight to New York City.
74
The agents approached Place and noticed that the address tags on his luggage were
different from each other.75 After further investigation, they discovered that neither
address existed.76 The agents contacted federal agents in New York and relayed their
suspicions about Place.
77
Two federal agents observed Place as he got off the plane in New York and
approached him after he claimed his bags.78  The agents told Place that they
suspected that his bag contained narcotics and requested to search his bags.79 When
Place refused, the agents explained that they were going to take his luggage to a judge
so that they could get a search warrant.80 The agents took the luggage to Kennedy
Airport, and ninety minutes after the initial seizure, a trained narcotics detection dog
sniffed the bags and alerted on one of them.81 Because it was late on a Friday
afternoon, the agents waited until the next Monday to seek a warrant from a
82
magistrate. After receiving the warrant, the agents opened the bag and found 1125
grams of cocaine.83 Place later pleaded guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute.84
A. Place Analysis
In Place, the Court fornally extended Terry reasoning from people to objects.85
The Court found that a possessory interest in property is an interest protected by the
Fourth Amendment and also found that the government had interfered with that
interest by exercising dominion and control over the luggage for the government's86
own purposes. Together, these two constitutional triggers provide the definition of a
U.S. 249 (1970), but did not offer much analysis, and generally limited its holding to its facts.
73. Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
74. Id at 698.
75. Id
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id at 699.
80. Id
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id
84. Id at 700.
85. "[W]e are asked to apply the principles of Teny v. Ohio... to permit such seizures on
the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts, that the luggage contains
contraband or evidence of a crime. In our view, such application is appropriate." Id. at 702.
86. Id. at 710.
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87
property seizure. A seizure occurs when the government exercises dominion and
control, for its own purposes, over property in which another has a possessory
interest.88  The Court then examined the reasonableness of the seizure, both at
inception and in scope.
First, in finding that the Fourth Amendment covers property interests, the Court
explained "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the 'right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." 89  The Court also noted that within its jurisprudence the detention of
personal property had always triggered Fourth Amendment analysis.90 Additionally,
the Court stated that the Fourth Amendment even protects the property interest "after
the owner has relinquished control of the property to a third party or, as here, from the
immediate custody and control of the owner."
91
Turning to the next trigger, the Court analyzed whether the government had
interfered with that possessory interest in property.92  The Court found that the
government did seize the luggage, stating, "There is no doubt that the agents made a
"seizure" of Place's luggage for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when ... the
agent told Place that he was going to take the luggage to a federal judge to secure
issuance of a warrant."93 Reduced to simple terms, the Court found that the agents
exercised dominion (a show of force) in order to control Place's luggage for their own
purposes (to conduct a limited criminal investigation).94
In this definition of "seizure," the Court echoed the Terry Court's emphatic
rejection of the term of art approach.9 5 In fact, it did not even entertain the idea that
87. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 730 n.3 (1984).
88. Id. at 730.
89. Place, 462 U.S. at 700 (emphasis in original).
90. Id at 701.
91. Id at 705.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 707.
94. Although the Jacobsen Court later announced a contrasting definition of seizure, it also
provided language that nicely captures the principle behind the Place definition, stating that "[t]he
decision by governmental authorities to exert dominion and control over [an object] for their own
purposes clearly constitute[s] a seizure.. . ." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.18
(1984). Note how this parallels the definition of seizure of persons announced in Terry. Under Terry,
a seizure of the person occurs when "the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). Using the
terms "dominion and control," the Terry definition can be restated as: a seizure occurs when a police
officer dominates a person (through a show or use of force), so as to control that person (preventing
that person from walking away) for the officer's own purposes (to conduct a limited criminal
investigation).
95. In its analysis of whether the dog sniff amounted to a "search," the Place Court used a
term of art approach, adopting the definition established in Katz v United States-a search occurs
when the government interferes with a reasonable expectation of privacy-when deciding that the
sniff did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search. Place, 462 U.S. at 706-07; Katz v. United
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the interference with Place's possessory interest amounted to something less than a
seizure. 96 Further, the Court did not look to the seizure's level of intrusiveness when
defining "seizure." The Court stated, "When the nature and extent of the detention
are minimally intrusive of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests, the opposing
law enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less than probable cause.
' 97
Seizures that are more than minimally intrusive on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests must be supported by probable cause, and seizures that are
minimally intrusive or less can be supported by a reasonable suspicion.98 Thus, any
government interference with a protected interest, even if only minimally intrusive, is
still a seizure: minimally intrusive seizures are just a subset of seizures that qualify for
reasonable suspicion analysis.
99
Having decided that the government seized the luggage, the Court next
addressed the constitutional reasonableness of the seizure at inception and in scope.
The Court rejected the "all-or-nothing" approach, which would require the seizure to
be supported by probable cause. 100 The Court sought the middle ground, deciding
that the government's actions amounted to a seizure but could still be reasonable if
based on reasonable suspicion. 10 1 While the Court never directly ruled on this point
in Place, the Court implied that the agents, with the facts known to them, could have
reasonably suspected that Place was distributing drugs.
Moving from the inception analysis, the Court placed scope limitations on
reasonable suspicion seizures. It limited reasonable suspicion seizures to
investigations "that [will] quickly confirm or dispel the authorities' suspicion." 1°2
The Court noted two factors to consider: 1) the length of the seizure, and 2) the
government's diligence in pursuing the investigation. 103 The Court noted that the
officers took the luggage from Place's direct possession, and that by taking his
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). For a discussion of this apparent
inconsistency, see discussion infra Part W.E.
96. Place, 462 U.S. at 703 ("We examine first the government interest offered as a
justification for a brief seizure of luggage .. ") (emphasis added).
97. Id. (emphasis added). The Court makes this clear on two other occasions: "Given the
fact that seizures of property can vary in intrusiveness, some brief detentions of personal effects may
be so minimally intrusive of Fourth Amendment interests that strong countervailing government
interests will justify a seizure based only on specific articulable facts [of criminal activity]." Id. at
705-06 (emphasis added). "[Ihe brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be
justifiable on reasonable suspicion." Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 706.
99. Id. at 705-06.
100. Like Terry, Place argued the "all-or-nothing" approach, arguing that once the property is
seized, the government must justify the seizure with probable cause. Id at 705.
101. Id. at 703.
102. Id at 702.
103. Id. at 709.
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luggage, the officers may have interfered with his personal itinerary!' 4 Because this
reasonable suspicion seizure was fairly intrusive-nearly equivalent to a Terry stop-
and because the agents had plenty of time to arrange for a dog to be at the New York
airport by the time Place arrived, the Court considered the officers' ninety minute
seizure to be too long.' 0 5 Thus, once the agents exceeded the reasonable suspicion
seizure's scope, they had to justify it with probable cause, which could not be done
under the facts.' 0 6 While it is unclear at what precise moment the seizure transitioned
from a reasonable suspicion seizure to a probable cause seizure, it is clear that within
ninety minutes, it had. Importantly, the Court considered the invasiveness of that
seizure on the person's property interest within its reasonableness inquiry, and not
when deciding whether a seizure had occurred in the first place.'
0 7
B. Van Leeuwen Revisited
Although the Court decided United States v. Van Leeuwen'0 8 thirteen years
before Place, Van Leeuwen fits into the Place framework and serves as a useful
factual contrast to Place. At 1:30 in the afternoon, Van Leeuwen mailed two
packages from within Washington State, one bound for Southern California and the
other for Tennessee.) 9 He declared that the packages contained coins and chose a
method of mailing that would not qualify the packages for discretionary inspection by
the post office." 10 A suspicious clerk notified a policeman, who then noticed that the
return addresses on the packages were bogus and that Van Leeuwen had Canadian
license plates!1 At 3:00 that afternoon, the policeman learned that the addressee in
California was under investigation for trafficking in illegal coins." 2 Due to the time
difference, the investigators could not reach authorities in Tennessee until the next
morning. 13 After learning that the Tennessee addressee was also under investigation
for trafficking in illegal coins, investigators in Washington filed for a search
warrant. 1 4 It was received at 4:00 p.m. and executed at 6:30 p.m.1
5
Van Leeuwen argued that the government illegally seized his mail, particularly
for the ninety minutes that the policeman held the mail while investigating his
104. Id at 708-09.
105. Id. at709-10.
106. Id
107. Id.
108. 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
109. ld at249.
110. Id at 249-50.
111. Id at 250.
112. Id
113. Id
114. Id.
115. Id
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suspicions.' 16 The Court looked to Teny for guidance 1 7 and applied a now familiar
model. First, the Court decided that Van Leeuwen had a protected interest to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures of his papers, "thus closed against
inspection, wherever they may be." 18 Next, the Court found that the government
had detained the mail. This detention triggered the application of the Fourth
Amendment because "[i]t has long been held that first-class mail.., is free fiom
inspection by postal authorities, except in the manner provided by the Fourth
Amendment."" 1
9
Last, the Court turned to the reasonableness of the seizure, as "even first-class
mail is not beyond the reach of all inspection; and the sole question here is whether
the conditions for its detention and inspection had been satisfied.' 120 Looking at the
seizure's inception, the Court found that the officer could have reasonably suspected
that the packages contained illegal coins.' 2  The Court then looked to the scope of
the seizure and declared that, "Detention for 1 1/2 hours-from 1:30 p.m. to 3 p.m.-
for an investigation certainly was not excessive; and at the end of that time probable
cause existed for believing that the California package was part of an illicit
project. ' '122 Detention of the Tennessee package, for which probable cause did not
exist until the following morning (a total of about seventeen hours) was also
reasonable because the agents had acted diligently, and the delay was the result of
working across different time zones.'
23
116. ld. at 252.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 251 (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878)).
119. Id. While the Court in Van Leeuwen uses the term "detention" throughout its opinion,
that use is consistent with this article's model for the definition of seizure. A seizure occurs when the
government interferes with a protected property or liberty interest. Detention (government
interference) plus a protected interest (possessory interest in mail) equals a seizure.
120. Id. at252.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 253. The Court used some imprecise language when discussing the overnight
delay, stating, "No interest protected by the Fourth Amendment was invaded by forwarding the
packages the following day rather than the day when they were deposited." Id. Elsewhere in the
opinion, the Court states, "There was at that point no possible invasion of [a Fourth Amendment
right]. Theoretically... detention of mail could at some point become an unreasonable seizure of
'papers' or 'effects' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 252. Some courts have
cited this language as support of the Jacobsen model, where the government interference with a
possessory interest must be meaningful for the Fourth Amendment to apply. See, e.g., United States
v. Ward, 144 F.3d 1024, 1031 (7th Cir. 1998). However, the Van Leeuwen Court did not fully
develop or analyze seizure principles-the Place court did, thirteen years later-and the analysis in
Van Leeuwen is sparse. The Court did not use either of those statements in its analysis, and the
statements actually run counter to the analysis the Court did apply. For example, if those statements
were true and no Fourth Amendment interest was implicated, what was the Court doing applying
Fourth Amendment analysis to the facts before it? If the detention did not implicate the Fourth
[Vol. 42:2
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The Court did not offer much more analysis beyond this. Broad
pronouncements on pure seizure law would come thirteen years later in Place. Still,
the Van Leeuwen analysis fits into the Place model. In both cases, the agents seized
the property and the Fourth Amendment applied. In both cases, the degree of
intrusion on the person's property interest only affected the scope of that seizure, not
the decision that the government activity triggered Fourth Amendment protection.
Certainly, Van Leeuwen reflects Place in that whenever a police officer exerts
dominion and control over an object in which another has a possessory interest for
their own purposes, the police officer has seized that object. Thus, Van Leeuwen
shows that in the definition of seizure, there is no room for varying degree. Degree is
important only in the seizure's reasonableness.
Additionally, Van Leeuwen presents a nice factual counterbalance to Place.
Because the seizure in Place was relatively intrusive, the Court said that the seizure
must have a narrow scope. Contrast this with the results in Van Leeuwen, where the
intrusion on the person's property interest was not so great and the Court allowed a
much broader scope for reasonableness: ninety minutes for one piece of mail and
seventeen hours for the other.
124
C. Summary of the Place Model
The Place model closely mirrors the Terry model upon which it is based. This
model has been followed by several lower federal courts.' 25 Stated again, the model
asks three fundamental questions: 1) is there a protected interest (a possessory interest
in property is protected), 2) has the government interfered with that interest (by
exercising dominion and control over the property for its own purposes), and 3) was
that interference reasonable at inception (at a minimum, a reasonable, articulable
suspicion for temporary seizures) and in scope (the government must limit its
investigation to those actions necessary to quickly confirm or dispel those suspicions,
considering the impact of the seizure on the property interest, the length of delay, and
government diligence).1 26 Again, the first two questions are constitutional triggers
Amendment, then the Court should not have conducted any analysis of the initial detention at all,
other than to say that a seizure did not occur. Instead, the Court conducted Fourth Amendment
analysis of the reasonableness of the seizure. In the hindsight that Place makes possible, it is clear
that the Court actually applied Terry and Place principles.
124. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 252-53.
125. See supra note 26.
126. See United States v. Aldaz, 921 E 2d 227, 231 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding a three day delay
in delivery of mail was reasonable because the government was acting diligently, most of the delay
was due to unrelated mechanical problems with airplanes, and much of the delay was the result of the
great distances and limited resources inherent to Alaska); United States v. Allen, 990 F.2d 667, 671-
72 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that a nine-hour delay that prevented the suspect from picking up the
package was reasonable because the government developed probable cause two hours before the
time that the carrier had guaranteed delivery); United States v. Martinez, 869 F. Supp. 202, 207-08
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and serve to define a seizure as when the government exercises dominion and control,
for its own purposes, over property in which another has a possessory interest.
127
IV. THE JACOBSEN MODEL
The major difference between the Place and Jacobsen models is that under the
Jacobsen model, a seizure occurs only when there is a meaningful government
interference with a possessory interest in property. 28 The Jacobsen model thereby
moves the "degree of interference" factor from the reasonableness inquiry into the
definition of seizure itself.
129
In United States v. Jacobsen, Federal Express employees accidentally punched a
hole in a box that they were shipping.' 30 After opening the box to document the
damage in anticipation of an insurance claim, they noticed white powder in
cellophane bags stuffed inside of a tube.'31 The FedEx employees then put the box
back the way they found it and called federal drug enforcement agents. 132 The
arriving agent assumed control of the box and saw the damage. 133 He then reached
into the box, removed the tube and cellophane bags with the white powder, and
conducted a field test on the powder.' 34 The test indicated that the powder was
cocaine. 135  Up to the point where the agent developed probable cause that the
package contained cocaine, no facts indicate that the agent's actions caused any
delays in delivering the package. 136 After the field test, agents applied for, received,
and executed a warrant.
137
While these facts suggest several Fourth Amendment implications, the focus
here will be on the initial seizure. The Court began its opinion by defining a seizure
of property as "some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
(S.D.N.Y 1994) (finding that an overnight delay was reasonable while the government diligently
investigated the facts, and developed probable cause before the packages would have been
delivered).
127. For a graphical representation of this model, see infra App. A.
128. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 109 (1984).
129. The Jacobsen model follows the same analysis as Place and Terry when analyzing the
reasonableness of any government actions, though it is evaluated at a different point in the process.
See infra Part IV.C.
130. Id. at 111.
131. Id
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 111-12, 118.
135. Id. at 112.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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interests in that property. ' 38  Eventually, this language spins off a differentframework for approaching pure property seizure issues.
A. The Actual Jacobsen Analysis
Once into its analysis, the Court abandoned the definition that it announced and
instead followed the Place model. First, the Court concluded that Jacobsen had a
protected property interest in the package.1 39 The Court then turned to whether the
government had interfered with that protected interest. 1
40
Like the Court in Place, the Jacobsen Court did not take issue with whether the
initial government action was enough to trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny,
reasoning that "[a]lthough respondents had entrusted possession of the items to
Federal Express, the decision by the governmental authorities to exercise dominion
and control over the package for their own purposes clearly constituted a 'seizure,'
though not necessarily an unreasonable one. ' 14 1 The Court thus applied a plain
meaning to the term seizure, deciding that when the government exercises dominion
and control over an object for its own purposes, the government has seized that item.
Interestingly, the agent's initial actions did not appear to meaningfully interfere with
Jacobsen's possessory interests in the box-the agent only had the box a few
moments before conducting the field test, and nothing indicates that the agent caused
the package to miss a delivery deadline.
The Court then examined the seizure's reasonableness. The Court decided that
the seizure was reasonable because the government agent had probable cause, based
on what the Federal Express employees told him, to believe that the box contained
contraband.142 Because the agents so clearly had probable cause, the Court did not
even have to address those portions of the Place model that deal with supporting a
seizure based on reasonable suspicion. 143 Therefore, with respect to the implication
of the Fourth Amendment of concern here-the initial seizure-the Court's analysis
was complete. As it turned out, the Court applied the Place model and never once
returned to the definition of seizure that it announced at the start of its opinion. 44
138. Id. at 113.
139. Id. at 114.
140. Id. at 115.
141. Id. at 120-21 n.18 (emphasis added).
142. Id at 121-22, & n.20.
143. Id at 122n.20.
144. Note that if the Court had applied its announced definition, it would have decided
that these actions did not amount to a seizure.
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B. The Jacobsen Model, As It Has Developed
Prior to the Jacobsen decision, the model for seizure was fairly clear. Terry,
Place, and Van Leeuwen provided a simple framework for analyzing pure property
seizures. Moreover, had lawyers taken a look at the actual Jacobsen reasoning, they
would have discovered that Jacobsen was actually decided using the Place
framework. However, commentators, 145 horn book authors, 46 some lower federal
courts, 147 and the Supreme Court 148 have taken the Jacobsen Court's initial definition
as the dogmatic definition of seizure without looking to the actual Jacobsen analysis.
As some lower federal courts have applied this definition, they have created a
framework that differs significantly from the Place model, thereby creating
competing models in the lower federal courts.
United States v. Ward,149 a Seventh Circuit case, illustrates the Jacobsen
model.' 50 Ward purchased a Greyhound bus ticket from Los Angeles to Indianapolis,
checked a bag that contained cocaine and a handgun on the bus, but did not board the
bus.' 5 1 Instead, he flew to Indianapolis the next day (the day the bus would arrive),
where he intended to pick up the bag.'5 2 Unfortunately for Ward, law enforcement
authorities knew that this bus line was frequented by drug couriers, and when the bus
stopped in Saint Louis, federal and local authorities were conducting counter-drug
operations. 53 Agents knew that a common drug-courier technique was for the
courier to check a bag to a destination city, then fly to that city and wait for the bag.'
54
If the courier believed that authorities were not suspicious of the bag, the courier
would collect it.155 If the courier believed that authorities were suspicious, the courier
would simply walk away.'
56
As part of the counter-drug operations, agents boarded the bus and identified a
different suspect (this suspect had no connection to Ward). 15 7 Agents discovered
drugs in one of his bags, and as part of their investigation of this suspect, the agents
145. See supra note 23.
146. See supra note 24.
147. See supra note 4.
148. See supra note 25.
149. 144 E3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1998).
150. See also United States v. England, 971 F.2d at 420-21 (9th Cir. 1992) (explicitly
distinguishing Jacobsen reasoning from Place and Van Leeuwen reasoning, and following Jacobsen
reasoning).
151. Wan, 144 F.3d at 1027-28.
152. Id at 1027.
153. Id.
154. Id at 1028.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1027.
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then decided to match all of the bags on the bus to the bus passengers, reasoning that
any leftover bags were probably bags that belonged to this suspect."' One
unclaimed bag caught the agents' attention. 59  This bag's tag showed that it
originated in South Central Los Angeles and had listed an area code but no local
phone number.' The agents pulled the bag off the bus and questioned the initial
suspect about it, but quickly ruled out this suspect as the owner of this bag.
16 1
Because the bag was checked to Indianapolis and none of the passengers was headed
there, the agents continued their investigation and called in a drug-sniffing dog.
16 2
During the period that the agents were waiting for the dog to arrive, the bus
left. 16 3 The dog arrived between seventy-five and ninety minutes later and
immediately became alerted to the bag, well before the bus would have arrived at its
destination. 64 The agents sought and obtained a search warrant and discovered the
bag's contents.165 The agents then contacted agents in Indianapolis, who packed a
dummy suitcase so that they could trap the person who claimed the bag.' 66 Ward
showed up after the bus arrived to claim the bag and was subsequently arrested.
167
Ward moved to suppress the cocaine and gun, which the district court denied, and
then pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine while reserving his right to
appeal the suppression of evidence issue.'
68
On appeal, the court applied Jacobsen reasoning, explicitly rejecting Place as the
appropriate model to follow. 16 9 The court's first step was to apply the Jacobsen
158. Id at 1027-28.
159. Id
160. Id at 1028.
161. Id
162. Id
163. Id
164. Id
165. Id
166. Id.
167. Id
168. Id at 1029-30. The district court recognized that two models existed and separately
applied both the Place and Jacobsen models, finding that under both, the seizure was reasonable.
169. Id at 1032. Oddly, the court cited two Place model cases as applications of the
Jacobsen model. The court cited the Van Leeuwen statement that 'no interest protected by the
Fourth Amendment was invaded' by the overnight delay in forwarding packages that the defendant
had sent through the mail." Ward, 144 E3d at 1031 (citing United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S.
249, 253 (1970) (emphasis omitted)). For discussion of this reference to Van Leeuwen, see supra
note 123.
The court also cited United States v. LaFrance, a case with similar facts, stating that that case
stands for the following rules: "[T]he owner's possessory interest is defined by the common carrier's
contractual obligations to deliver the bag at a specified time", Ward, 144 F.3d at 1031; and "[A]
detention does not begin to interfere with the owner's possessory interest until it delays delivery of
the package beyond the contractually agreed-upon hour." Id However, the LaFrance court believed
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definition of seizure, saying, "A 'seizure' of property connotes 'some meaningful
interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property .... ,170 The
court then looked at the agents' initial action: taking the luggage from the common
luggage area of the bus and setting it aside while questioning the initial suspect.'71
The court found that, at that point, the government did not meaningfully interfere
with Ward's possessory interests in the luggage because Ward had given the luggage
over to a common carrier, thereby relinquishing possessory interest in the bag. 12
Specifically, the court found that at the time Ward gave the bag to Greyhound "[h]e
could reasonably have foreseen that the bag would be handled, moved around, and
even taken off the bus, whether at intermediate stops when the driver might need to
remove the bag to sort and/or gain access to other luggage, or ... transfer[] [it] to
another bus."' 73 Thus, Ward had "no reasonable expectation.., that the bag would
not be touched, handled, or even removed from the bus prior to the bag's arrival in
Indianapolis." 1
74
The court also found that because Ward did not accompany his bag, the
government did not meaningfully interfere with his possessory interest in the bag.' 75
The court reasoned that the agent did not seize the bag "merely by touching and then
removing it from the luggage compartment"' 176 and concluded that this initial action
by the govemment did not amount to a "seizure"' 177 and so did not trigger Fourth
Amendment scrutiny.'78
The court then turned to the next point where a seizure might have occurred-
when the agents decided to keep the bag for a dog sniff. 179 By calling for a dog sniff,
that a seizure occurred on the facts before it, applied the Place definition of seizure and followed the
Place framework. United States v. LaFrance, 879 F.2d 1, 4 (1989) ("In this case, the police seized
[the] package. They did so on reasonable suspicion that it contained contraband... Once having seized
the parcel, the officers exercised effective control over it for some five and one-quarter hours...").
Further, the LaFrance court clearly made the statements that the Ward court attributes to it in the
context of the reasonableness of the seizure's scope: "Appellees do not contest the reasonableness of
the initial seizure, nor could they successfully do so. We are therefore required to weigh the length of
the detention and its impact upon defendants' [F]ourth [A]mendment interests against the importance
of law enforcement concerns. Id. at 6. The Ward court's representations of LaFrance as
supportive of the Jacobsen model are simply wrong, and also illustrate how the Jacobsen model
moves the "meaningful interference" factor from the reasonableness inquiry to the threshold inquiry.
170. Ward, 144 F.3d at 1033 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 133) (1984)).
171. Id. at 1033.
172. Id. at 1032-33.
173. Id. at 1032.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1033.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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the agents ensured that the bag would not continue on with the bus.18° The court
decided that if the bus arrived at its destination without the bag, the government
would have meaningfully interfered with Ward's contractually-based possessory
interest in his bag, and so the government would need to have at least a reasonable
suspicion at that point.18 1 However, by that point, the government had developed
probable cause to seize the bag: the dog sniff occurred before the bag would have
arrived in Indianapolis, thereby giving the agents probable cause to seize the bag and
keep it past the arrival time.' 82 During the period that was supported by something
less than probable cause, the government never meaningfully interfered with Ward's
possessory interests in his bag, and so never seized the bag.
The court then assumed for argument's sake that when the agents made the
decision to subject the bag to a dog sniff, the agents seized the bag.' 84 This dicta
provides a useful example of how to apply the Jacobsen model had the court found a
"meaningful interference."' 85 The court analyzed whether this seizure would have
been reasonable at its inception by looking to whether the agents had reasonable
suspicion when they made this decision.'8 The court decided that the agents did
have reasonable suspicion, based both on the facts before the agents and the agents'
knowledge of common drug courier tactics. 87
Satisfied that this hypothetical seizure would have been reasonable at inception,
the court then analyzed whether it would have been reasonable in scope.' 88 The court
checked whether the agents acted diligently (the Court found that they did), and
whether the length of the detention was acceptable.' 89 The Court noted that while the
length of detention here was around three hours, and that the Place Court had found
that ninety minutes was too long, certain factors that were present in Place were
missing in the fact pattern before it.' 90 First, the bag was not seized fiom Ward's
possession, and second, Ward had chosen a slow means of transportation. (A three
hour delay was not unreasonable on a two day bus trip).191 Based on these facts, the
Court concluded that the scope was reasonable.'
92
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1033-34.
183. Id. at 1034.
184. Id.
185. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
186. Ward, 144 U.S. at 1034.
187. Id.
188. Id at 1035.
189. Id
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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C. Summary of the Jacobsen Model
Courts that follow Jacobsen use a framework that is different from the Place
framework. 19 3 The Jacobsen model asks two questions. First, has there been a
seizure (has the government meaningfully interfered with a person's possessory
interest in an item)?' 94 Generally, the government has not meaningfully interfered
with a person's possessory interest unless the government has taken the item directly
from the person or somehow also interfered with the person's liberty interests (say, by
causing the item to miss the person's expected pick-up time).195  This inquiry
contains the critical difference between the two models-it imports the degree of
interference factor from the Place model's reasonableness inquiry into its threshold
definition for seizure.
Second, the Jacobsen model asks, if there has been a seizure, was the seizure
reasonable in inception and scope. 196 If the government did seize the item, the
seizure must still be reasonable-supported by at least a reasonable suspicion. Last,
the seizure cannot exceed the scope allowed by reasonable suspicion seizures--those
courses of action that will quickly confirm or dispel the government's suspicion.1
97
This reasonableness analysis is the same as that found in the Place model.
V CHOOSING PLACE OVER JACOBSEN
The significant difference between the two models is where you factor in the
degree of intrusion on the person's property interest. Under Place, this occurs in the
reasonableness inquiry.198 Under Jacobsen, this inquiry is in the definition of seizure
itself 99 Several reasons favor choosing the Place model over the Jacobsen model.
First, and most simply, Place is good law while the Jacobsen definition is only dicta.
Furthermore, the Place model values property interests and reflects the degree to
which the Fourth Amendment protects property, while the Jacobsen model
undervalues property interests and does not correctly reflect the Fourth Amendment's
protections. Next, the Jacobsen model is based on a term of art definition and
thereby incorporates the dangers that Terry warned of, which severely limits its
193. See generally id.; Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985); Soldal v. Cook
County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992).
194. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
195. E.g., United States v. England, 971 F.2d 419, 420-21 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that people
who place items in the United States mail possess a lower level of interest in the items than if they
were checked on a common carrier); United States v. Visser, 40 M.J. 86, 90 (C.M.A 1994) (finding
that the government action did not cause some household goods to remain in storage or transit for
any longer than the suspect expected them to be).
196. Jacobsen, 460 U.S. at 115.
197. For a graphical representation of this model, see infra App. A.
198. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983).
199. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
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usefulness. Alternately, Place chooses a common sense approach that avoids these
dangers, while still providing the government plenty of room to conduct
investigations. Finally, the Jacobsen model does not even parallel the apparent
source of its definition (search analysis), while the Place model does.
A. Place Is Good Law: The Jacobsen Definition Is Dicta
As shown earlier, the Jacobsen Court itself followed the Place definition and
model in its reasoning.20° The Court did not apply the very definition it announced in
the case, thereby making it mere dicta. In fact, had the Jacobsen Court applied the
model that has developed based on the definition that it announced, it would have
come to a different conclusion in that case. In Jacobsen, the agent merely took the
package from the Federal Express employees and conducted a field test on the
powder that was found inside.2 °1 He did not cause the package to reach its
destination any later, take the package directly from Jacobsen's presence, or otherwise
"meaningfully interfere" with his possessory interest.20 2 Based on the "meaningful
interference" definition, the Court should have said that there was no seizure. But the
Court found that there was a seizure, announcing the true definition of property
seizure as, "the decision by the governmental authorities to exercise dominion and
control over the package for their own purposes .... ,203
While the Supreme Court has subsequently cited the dicta Jacobsen definition, it
has never applied this definition in any meaningful way. Further, Terry and Place
have not been overturned by the Supreme Court and their models are still binding.
Therefore, the Jacobsen model, as developed by lower courts, does not follow the
precedent set by Terry and Place and should not be followed.
B. The Fourth Amendment Protects All Property Interests: Place Agrees
The Court made clear in Soldal v. Cook County° that the Fourth Amendment
guards property interests just as jealously as it guards privacy and liberty interests.20 5
200. See discussion supra Part I.B.
201. Jacobsen,466 U.S. at 111-12.
202. Id. at 126.
203. Id. at 120-21 n.18.
204. 506 U.S. 56(1992). For more discussion on Soldal, see infra Part VI.
205. See William C. Heffeman, Property, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 60 BROOK. L.
REv. 633, 654 (1994). Heffeman traces the development of Fourth Amendment search and seizure
law from United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), through Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967). Under Olmstead, the primary interests served by the Amendment were "to prohibit
unreasonable trespasses on property" and "to protect people in their possession of material things."
Id. at 639. Katz turned to a privacy-based analysis, and the question Heffeman examined was, "Did
Katz turn Olmstead on its head? That is, where Olmstead had made it necessary to show
infringement of a property interest to assert a [F]ourth [A]mendment claim, did Katz make it
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It declared that "[w]hat matters is the intrusion on the people's security from
governmental interference. 206 The people's security consists of liberty, privacy, and
property interests, together or separately.20 7 The free exercise of property rights, like
the free exercise of liberty and the right to privacy, is a critical component of the
people's security.
208
The Place model conforms to this constitutional mandate. The Place Court
made clear that whenever the government interferes with a person's property interest,
the Fourth Amendment will govern the government's conduct.20 9 When deciding
whether the government has seized an item, there is no room for degree. But the
Jacobsen model, by importing the degree of intrusion on property rights from the
reasonableness inquiry into the definition of seizure inquiry, essentially states that
there are some property interests that are not worthy of Fourth Amendment
protections.210
The Jacobsen model asserts that once a person transfers an item to a bailee, that
person no longer has a possessory interest in the property, or that any remaining
interest is so slight that the Fourth Amendment should not protect it.21 1 According to
the Jacobsen model, the Fourth Amendment should only protect meaningful property
212interests. However, people do retain a significant property interest in objects that
they transfer to a bailee.213 Place makes it clear that the Fourth Amendment guards
property rights even "after the owner has relinquished control of the property to a
third party.''214 Indeed, that is the exact fact pattern found in Van Leeuwen, where the
necessary to show infringement of a privacy interest to assert such a claim?" Id at 645. Heffeman
answers the question, "[N]o." Id. "Katz heralded not another single-variable approach to the Fourth
Amendment, but instead a multi-variable approach in which privacy, property and liberty interests
stand on their own... Id. Consequently, interference with possessory interests is sufficient to
trigger the Fourth Amendment-an interference with privacy or liberty interest is not needed. Soldal,
506 U.S. at 63-64.
206. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 69.
207. Id. at 62.
208. Id.
209. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700-01 (1983).
210. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
211. Id. at 113, 117-18.
212. See supra note 4.
213. See generally, BARLOW BURKE & JOSEPH A. SNOE, PROPERTY: EXAMPLES &
EXPLANATIONS 55-65 (2001). At some point, a person can transfer all possessory or other property
interest in an object, such as when that person sells the object, gives it away, throws it away, or
abandons it. When that happens, the Fourth Amendment will not be triggered by police activity
because the person no longer has a protected property interest in that object Maryland v. Macon,
472 U.S. 463,469 (1985). In Macon, the Court found that the seller of an obscene magazine did not
have a possessory interest in the magazines once he voluntarily sold the magazine to an undercover
officer. Id. The suspect transferred all property interests in the magazines when he sold them, and
therefore no longer had any protected property interest in them. Id
214. Place, 462 U.S. at 705 (emphasis added).
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Court found that the government's conduct was regulated by the Fourth
Amendment. 
15
The Jacobsen model also asserts that the bailor, by transferring the property to a
bailee, has essentially given consent for others (including government agents) to
handle her property in any way.216 Certainly, when a bailor transfers her property to a
bailee, she implicitly authorizes other people to handle her property in certain ways-
the handling that would come in the normal course of the contracted-for action.
2 17
However, the bailor's implied authorization for her property to be handled in certain
limited ways by the bailee does not include the authorization for anyone else to do
whatever that other person might want to do with the bailor's property.
Certainly, the bailor's implied consent for her property to be handled in certain
limited ways does not include the implied consent for the government to assert a
superior interest in her property so that the government can conduct a criminal
investigation.2 18 To interfere with the bailor's remaining property interest in the
luggage, the government must have the clear authority of law-at least a reasonable
suspicion that the property contains evidence of criminal activity.
The proper place to measure the degree of intrusion on a property interest is in
the reasonableness inquiry. The degree of property interest that the government
interferes with is an important factor in determining how much information the
government must have before seizing the object, and in defining the permissible
scope of that seizure, but not in deciding whether a seizure has occurred in the first
place.
215. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1970).
216. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117.
217. BuRKE&SNOE, supra note 213, at 55.
218. The Warn court made the flawed argument that Ward implicitly consented to the
handling of his luggage by the government. United States v. Ward, 144 E3d 1024, 1033 (7th Cir.
1998). See discussion supra Part. IVB. However, the Supreme Court made clear in Bond v. United
States that when a person gives luggage to a common carrier, that person does not somehow give the
government implied consent to handle the luggage for the purpose of conducting a criminal
investigation. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000). Using search analysis, the Court
decided that when the govemment squeezed a piece of luggage that was in an overhead luggage rack,
the government had frisked that bag. Id at 337-38. The Court rejected the govermnent's argument
that a bailor should expect that his luggage will be handled in this way. Id at 338-39. The Court
stated:
When a bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he expects that other passengers or
bus employees may move it for one reason or another. Thus, a bus passenger clearly
expects that his bag may be handled. He does not expect that other passengers or bus
employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner.
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C. The Jacobsen Model Includes the Term ofArt Dangers
The Jacobsen definition is a term of art that creates a threshold requirement for
government activity to qualify as a "seizure." 2 1 9 The Teny Court warned that using a
term of art approach to seizures is dangerous in that "[i]t seeks to isolate from
constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the policeman and the
citizen. ' '220 The Jacobsen model integrates that danger. Compared to the Terry and
Place models, the Jacobsen Model places a broad range of government activity
221beyond constitutional scrutiny.
Consider that in the introductory hypothetical, a police officer could take a
citizen's package from a shipping center, to her office, and conduct a limited criminal
investigation-without even having a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Subsequent discussion has shown other fact patterns that, if analyzed under the
Jacobsen model, are beyond constitutional scrutiny: the police can remove your
luggage from an airplane or bus, even to the point of the airplane or bus leaving
without it, and can hold your mail for extended periods of time-all without any
reason to suspect you of criminal activity. Essentially, under Jacobsen, if you give an
item to a third person, then the police can do what they want with your property for
no reason at all, provided you do not know what the police are doing. This potential
for abuse should offend most people. As Justice Stewart cited in Katz v. United
States: "The average man would very likely not have his feelings soothed any more
by having his property seized openly than by having it seized privately or by
stealth.'2
22
This danger is not just theoretical. Because the Jacobsen model includes a high
hurdle in its definition of seizure, most courts that use the Jacobsen model resolve
cases on this prong, thereby deciding that the police conduct does not amount to a
seizure and, consequently, never reviewing the reasonableness of the government's
223
actions.
This leads to the next danger that the Terry Court exposed, that "by suggesting a
rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and regulation under the [Fourth]
Amendment, it obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope, as well as the
initiation, of police actions as a means of constitutional regulation."'224 The Jacobsen
219. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
220. Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17(1968).
221. To see this represented graphically, see infra App. A.
222. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.4 (1967) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
223. E.g., Ward, 144 F.3d 1024, at 1032-33; United States v. England, 971 F.2d419, 421 (9th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Lovell, 849 F.2d 910, 916 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Quiroz, 57 F.
Supp. 2d 805, 813 (D. Minn. 1999); United States v. Wood, 6 F Supp. 2d 1213, 1224-25 (D. Kan.
1998); United States v. Visser, 40 M.J. 86,90 (C.M.A. 1994).
224. Teny, 392 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added).
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model comes as close to being an "all or nothing" model as it can, thereby choking
off the range available for reasonable suspicion searches and obscuring the value of
their scope limitations. To see how this has happened, consider that the facts in Place
represent the upper threshold of what government agents can do at inception and still
only minimally intrude on a person's property interests. The Place seizure was nearly
equivalent to a Terry stop: by seizing the luggage, the agents essentially placed some
conditions on Place's liberty2 25 The agents really could not have done much more
without exceeding even the limits of a Terry stop.226 With just slightly more intrusive
facts, the government would have done more than minimally intrude on Place's rights
(as in, the government would now have meaningfully interfered with Place's rights),
and so would been required to show probable cause for the seizure.
But the Jacobsen model requires "meaningful interference" to implicate a
person's liberty interest.227 Reasonable suspicion seizures are therefore choked off.
This distortion manifests itself as the narrow range of facts that, under the inception
prong, can qualify for reasonable suspicion. Either the conduct would not be a
seizure (no meaningful interference), or the conduct would be a seizure (meaningful
interference, or more than minimally intrusive) and the government would be
required to support it with probable cause.
The distortion also is apparent in the "scope" prong. Under Place, ninety
minutes will almost always be too long to seize an item based on reasonable
suspicion when the seizure is significantly intrusive on possessory interests.228 Under
the Jacobsen model, every detention that qualifies as a seizure will be at this high
level of intrusion, because it had to be at that high level of intrusion just to qualify as a
seizure. 229 So, almost all reasonable suspicion seizures under Jacobsen must be less
than ninety minutes, and probably significantly less (in the range of what is
appropriate for a Terry stop). The Terry Court warned that "a rigid all or nothing
model of justification and regulation... obscures the utility of limitations upon the
scope" of reasonable suspicion searches. The Court was right.
Taken together, these two distortions severely limit the usefulness of the
Jacobsen model. Almost all government activity is beyond constitutional scrutiny,
and if the government's actions do amount to a "meaningful interference," these
actions will almost always require probable cause. Reasonable suspicion seizures
might as well not exist.
225. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708-09 (1983).
226. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
227. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
228. Place, 462 U.S. at 710.
229. See Jacobsen, 392 U.S. at 113.
230. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
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D. The Place Model Does Not Bind the Government s Hands
Courts appear to use "meaningful interference" because they are afraid that,
under the Place model, they may have to exclude compelling evidence of guilt.
23 1
However, the Place model allows plenty of room to admit evidence. While a wide
range of government conduct will trigger the Fourth Amendment, the government
only needs to justify its actions with a reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is
232
a low hurdle and will often be easily met. Generally, for reasonable suspicion, the
231. One of the reasons that the Wan court may have distinguished its case from Place is that
under the Place model, the court would have had to rule that the seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment. The court found that under these facts the agents did not have reasonable suspicion to
pull the bag from the luggage compartment: the bag originated from a high-crime area in the source
city; there was an identification tag that had an area code but no phone number, the other suspect had
joined the bus in the same source city; and the other suspect had just been found with cocaine.
United States v. Ward, 144 F.3d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir. 1998). For some reason, when coming to that
decision, the court did not explicitly consider the agents' knowledge of the drug trade. Finding that
the agents did not have reasonable suspicion, had the court followed Place, the court would have had
to rule that the seizure was unreasonable at inception, and therefore exclude compelling evidence of
guilt. Based on these facts, however, the court could have easily found that the agents had a
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1034.
232. In addition to the facts found in Place and Van Leeuwen, for facts amounting to
reasonable suspicion, see Ward, 144 E3d at 1034 (finding reasonable suspicion when a bag was
checked onto a bus without a passenger-a common practice of drug couriers); United States v.
Glover, 104 E 3d 1570, 1576 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding reasonable suspicion when a package smelled
strongly of coffee; the suspect's daughter was suspected of drug trafficking; the return address on
package was fictitious; and the cost of shipping the package was greater than the value of the coffee it
could have contained); United States v. Allen, 990 F.2d 667, 671 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding reasonable
suspicion when the suspect received three Express Mail packages in five months; the suspect had
received mail from suspicious addresses in the past; the handwriting on the labels was the same but
the return addresses were different; one of the senders was known to have previously sent psilocybin;
and the sender's address was fictitious); United States v. Banks, 3 F.3d 399, 402 (11th Cir. 1993)
(finding reasonable suspicion when a reliable confidential informant told police that the suspect often
mailed drugs, then picked the package up at the receiving end); United States v. Aldaz, 921 F.2d 227,
228, 231 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding reasonable suspicion when police previously suspected that a
suspect was dealing drugs through the mail; the suspect always had money but was unemployed; the
suspect mailed packages with his girlfriend's return address while she waited in the car; and she
mailed packages with his return address while he waited in the car); United States v. LaFrance, 879
F.2d 1, 2, 4 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding reasonable suspicion when there were anonymous tips about the
suspects involvement in drug trade and that the suspect delivered drugs through express mail to a
particular location; and confirmation that he did use express mail to send packages to that location);
United States v. Martinez, 869 F. Supp. 202, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding reasonable suspicion when
an informant stated that drugs were going to be shipped from Puerto Rico to New York via Express
Mail; inspectors found two packages that were heavily wrapped, came from a known source state,
had handwritten labels, the handwriting was the same but the return addresses were different, and
were mailed from two different post offices); United States v. Visser, 40 M.J. 86, 87-88, 90 (C.M.A.
1994) (finding reasonable suspicion following a report that tires and other items were stolen from a
government agency, and the stolen tires were visible on suspect's trailer).
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government just needs to articulate the legitimate reasons that caused the government
to choose that item over others.233 There must be some facts that led the government
to suspect criminal activity-the government did choose this bag or box or suitcase-
the government just needs to say what those facts were.234 If the government can
provide a legitimate reason why those facts relate to that item (assuming that the
government was not using race as the primary factor), the courts should find that the
government had reasonable suspicion.
Further, the Place model provides the government with plenty of time to develop
probable cause after they have seized an item based on reasonable suspicion. Once
the government has shown reasonable suspicion, courts can find that even long
seizures are reasonable-upwards of many hours or even days.2 16 Provided the
agents are acting diligently, the agents can generally seize an item that a person gives
to a bailee all the way up to the delivery time of that item, and even for some short
period of time thereafter."2
37
E. Jacobsen Does Not Parallel Search Analysis, While Place Does
The Jacobsen model actually seems to be based more on traditional search
doctrine than seizure doctrine.238  Apparently, the Jacobsen Court molded its
definition of seizure in an effort to match the "search" definition. When the Court
stated its definition, the Court began with a reference to searches: "[a] 'search' occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is
infringed, [and a] 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual's possessory interest in that property.' 239 While this
definitional revision makes for an eloquent statement, it is flawed. The two
statements are not actually parallel.
To see this, take a step back from the definition of "search" and look at its parts.
The search model looks like this: 1) was there a protected privacy interest?; 2) has the
government interfered with that interest?; 3) was that interference reasonable?240
The first trigger is the focal point of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Deciding
whether someone has an interest covered by the Fourth Amendment is not always
self-evident. The Court defines "privacy" on a case-by-case basis, using a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test that requires one to look at the circumstances
233. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
234. Id
235. Id.
236. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1970).
237. Id.
238. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119-22 (1984).
239. Id. at 113 (internal citations omitted).
240. Id.
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in each case just to decide whether the person has a protected privacy interest. 24 1 In
the "reasonable expectation of privacy test," there is no grey area: either you have a
reasonable expectation of privacy that implicates the Fourth Amendment, or you do
not. Note also that this analysis focuses on the person's reasonable expectations, not
on the government's actions and intent. Thus, a person's expectation of privacy is not
related to the government activity giving rise to the search.
Once this inquiry is satisfied, the court must decide whether the government's
actions intruded on that right; generally, this is obvious from the facts. Like the first
trigger, there no grey area: either the government interfered with that privacy interest,
or the government did not.
So far, nothing in this analysis of the "search" definition looks like a term of art.
"Search" becomes a "term of art" for another reason.242 Generally, having found that
the person did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, so no protected privacy
interest, the Court declares that the government's activity is not a "search"--even
though the activity would look like a search to a layperson. Really, the Court is
saying that the person does not have a privacy interest that is protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, the Fourth Amendment is not triggered. But by answering both
the first trigger (is there a constitutionally protected interest) and the second trigger
(has the government interfered with that interests) with one statement, the Court
obfuscates the distinction between the two inquiries, and creates an apparent term of
art.
At its base, seizure analysis does not involve a term of art, either. Comparing
search analysis to the Terry and Place seizure analysis reveals that they are
fumdamentally the same. The search analysis asks: 1) is there a protected privacy
interest? (a reasonable expectation of privacy); 2) has the government interfered with
that interest?; 3) was that interference reasonable.243 The seizure analysis asks: 1) is
there a protected property interest?; 2) has the government interfered with that
interest?; 3) was that interference reasonable? 244
241. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
242. See DRESSLER, supra note 24, at § 7.01. ("'Search' is a technical term of art in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. The word is not employed by lawyers in its ordinary and popular
sense.").
243. Jacobson, 466 U.S. at 113.
244. Id. It is now recognizable that the difference between the "search" model and the Teny
and Place "seizure" model is really only a difference in semantics, not substance, with the search
model providing one answer to the first two prongs, instead of being precise and providing two.
When the Teny Court announced its decision, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz--the
source of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test--had not yet gained the persuasive hold over
search doctrine that it now has gained. Terry was decided just months after Katz, and the Terry
Court's emphatic rejection of turning the definition of "search" doctrine into a term of art has, in the
end, lost out to the Katz approach-although the underlying analysis is essentially the same. Still, the
Terry analysis won the semantics war in seizure law. Place solidified the fork in the road between
seizure analysis and search analysis. The Place Court chose the Terry common-sense approach for
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In both the search model and the seizure model, the first prong focuses on the
person's constitutionally protected interest.245 In the seizure model, this inquiry is
fairly easy. The interests-liberty or property-are simple to define, generally self-
evident, and do not receive much analysis.246 Narrowing the discussion to property
seizures, either a person has a possessory interest in the object, or she does not.247 In
the search model, though, this prong is a more difficult and lengthy inquiry. But once
a protected interest is identified, both models agree that there is either a protected
interest that triggers the Fourth Amendment, or there is not.248
In both models, the second prong focuses on the government's activity. In
search jurisprudence, deciding whether the government has interfered with a privacy
interest is usually not even discussed because it is so obvious. 25  In seizure
jurisprudence, deciding whether the government has interfered with that interest
becomes a significant focus of the inquiry.25 1 But as Terry and Place show, that
inquiry is actually easy. Just as in the search model, where there is no such thing as a
"meaningful interference with a reasonable expectation of privacy," under the Terry
and Place model, there is no such thing as a "meaningful interference with a
possessory interest.
' 252
The Jacobsen model makes the mistake of unnecessarily looking to the search
model's first trigger-the inquiry into whether the person even has a privacy
interest-and importing like-sounding language into the second trigger of seizure
253analysis-whether the government has interfered with a protected interest. In an
attempt at creating an eloquent phrase that would parallel the oft-quoted language
used in search analysis, the Jacobsen Court failed to notice that it was not quoting in a
seizures, but the Katz term of art approach for searches. The Place Court had the opportunity to
adopt a term of art approach towards seizures in its analysis-after all, it applied the Katz term of art
definition of "search" when it decided that dog sniffs did not amount to Fourth Amendment
searches-but it clearly rejected that approach in its seizure analysis. The Court's decision that dog
sniffs that detect the scent of contraband items does not amount to a "search" (more precisely, that
people do not have a protected privacy interest in the scent of contraband items) recently survived
attack in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,416-17 (2005).
245. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
246. Id
247. E.g., Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463,469 (1985) (no possessory interest in magazines
sold to an undercover agent).
248. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
249. Id.
250. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696 (1983).
251. See generally Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124-25.
252. See generally id. at 113.
253. Id.
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parallel fashion at all-it was knocking down pylons as it cut across lanes of traffic.
Because the Court ultimately used the Place analysis, this mistake went unnoticed.
254
V. COMPLETING THE PLACE MODEL ANALOGY TO SEIZURES OF PERSONS
Now that the Place model has been fully developed, a comparison with the Terry
model can be established that will allow the placement of the few Supreme Court
cases that do deal with pure property seizures (and which cite the Jacobsen definition
for seizures) into categories against their Terry counterparts. Charted below, the
seizure cases will be discussed in detail in this section.
Government Intrusion on Property Government Intrusion Information Needed
Interests on Liberty Interests at Inception
None (no government dominion and None (questions on the None
control; merely handles or moves, not for street, person is free to
a government purpose) leave)
Hicks 55  Royert
56
Limited (government exercises Limited (person is not Reasonable
dominion and control to conduct limited free to leave, but not Suspicion
to criminal investigation; temporary; no under arrest)
intent yet to book into evidence)
Terry,260Bostick,261
Place,257 Van Leeuwen,258 Jacobsen59  Drayton
262
Significant (permanent seizure; Significant (arrest) Probable Cause
government intends to book into
evidence; government exceeds scope of
reasonable suspicion seizure)
Place,
2 63 Soldal_64
Id. at 124.
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,324 (1987).
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,497-98 (1983).
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970).
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123-24.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 30-31 (1968).
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,435-37 (1991).
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,203-04 (2002).
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-09 (1983).
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61-62 (1992).
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265First, Arizona v. Hicks, is another case generally known as a "search" case for
its pronouncements on the plain view doctrine. However, the case does briefly deal
with seizure issues. In Hicks, a bullet was fired from Hicks' apartment, went through
the floor to the apartment below, and struck a man..26 6  Police entered Hick's
apartment seeking the shooter and any other victims, and found several weapons and
other evidence of criminal activity.267 One officer also "noticed two sets of expensive
stereo components, which seemed out of place in the squalid and otherwise ill-
appointed four-room apartment."2 68 Based on his experience, the officer suspected
that this stereo equipment was stolen property.269 To confirm his suspicions, he
recorded the serial numbers of several of the components, but had to move a turntable
so that he could see the serial number.270 He radioed in the serial numbers and
learned that many of the components, including the turntable, had been stolen in an
armed robbery.
271
The officers' entry of the apartment under exigent circumstances was not an
issue,272 so the Court next discussed whether the officer "seized" the turntable by
273
shifting it so that he could read the serial numbers. The Court spent a mere
paragraph on this issue (the remainder of the opinion dealt with whether the officer's
actions amounted to a search):
As an initial matter, the State argues that [the officer's initial] actions constituted
neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
We agree that the mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a
seizure. To be sure, that was the first step in a process by which [Hicks] was
eventually deprived of the stereo equipment. In and of itself, however, it did not
"meaningfully interfere" with [Hicks'] possessory interest in either the serial
274
numbers or the equipment, and therefore did not amount to a seizure.
The Court applied, in a conclusory fashion, the Jacobsen definition and found
that the government's initial actions of handling the turntable and recording the serial
number did not amount to a seizure. 275 However, by applying the Place reasoning, it
265. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
266. Id. at 323.
267. Id
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 323-24.
272. Id. at 324.
273. Id.
274. Id (citations omitted).
275. Id. The Court overturned Hicks' conviction, though, stating that the officer's actions
amounted to a search that exceeded the scope of the exigent circumstances authorization that allowed
the officers to be in the apartment in the first place. Id. at 325. Later in the opinion, the Court
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is clear that Hicks properly fits into the Place model. Applying the Place model's
definition of seizure, the officer's actions did not amount to a seizure. The officer did
not intend to exercise dominion and control of this turntable. He did not pick it up
and set it aside or take it to his patrol car, indicating that he was now in control of that
object; the officer simply handled it for a moment. 76 In this sense, Hicks serves as an
example of police conduct that involves the handling of property that does not
amount to a seizure. This is the mere handling or touching of property, with no
government intent to exercise dominion and control over it. To relate this to Terry,
this action is equivalent to a police officer directing questions to a person on the
street, when that person is still free to leave.
acknowledged and approved of the Place "seizure" model, although it slightly modified it. Id
Because the Court cited both models in this opinion, this opinion does not advance the substantive
discussion of the models, but does serve as a nice factual bracket for Place and example of
government conduct that does not amount to a seizure, even under the Place model.
Interestingly, the government had argued that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the
turntable was stolen, and so could seize it under the Place model. Id at 326. The Court made this
argument a non-issue by deciding that no seizure took place, but addressed it while rebutting the
dissent's arguments. However, if you assume for the sake of argument that the officer's initial actions
amounted to a seizure (remember, the actions did not amount to a seizure because the officer did not
intend to exercise dominion and control over the turntable), this argument should have worked.
Assume that the officer seized the item by taking it down to his patrol car while he made the radio
call. Turn next to the inception prong of the reasonableness analysis. The officer made this seizure
based on the fact that the stereo equipment was out of place in a dingy apartment, an apartment that
was obviously used for criminal activity. That amounts to reasonable suspicion, and the inception
prong is satisfied. Finally, turn to the scope prong of the reasonableness analysis. The officer's
actions were clearly within the scope of that seizure-he immediately made a phone call which
confirmed that the stereo equipment was stolen, thereby giving him probable cause to permanently
seize the equipment. Under Place, if there had been a seizure, the seizure would have survived
scrutiny.
The Court rejected this argument, however, primarily because the police conduct occurred in a
home and not in a public place. Id. at 326-28. Noting that a seizure can be justified on less than
probable cause, the Court stated: "We have held that [a seizure] can [be supported by reasonable
suspicion]--where, for example, the seizure is minimally intrusive and operational necessities render
it the only practicable means of detecting certain types of crime." Id. at 327 (citing Place to support
this proposition) (emphasis added). After adding the "operational necessities" requirement to the
Place model's inception prong, the Court found that there were none on the facts before it. Important
to note is that the Court's reasoning here is purely dicta. At this point in its reasoning, the Court had
already decided that the officer's actions did not amount to a seizure, and included this commentary
to rebut the dissent's counter-argument. Id. Even if this language is given the force of law, the most
it would do is cause a modification of this article's Place model by excepting out, in the "reasonable
at inception" prong, any seizures that occur in a home. Those seizures would always require
probable cause unless the government could also articulate some additional operational necessity for
the seizure.
276. Id. at 323.
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Next, in Soldal v. Cook County,277 a case arising outside of the criminal justice
system, Soldal and his family were forcibly evicted from a trailer park when their
landlord, accompanied by county sheriffs, disconnected the Soldal trailer home from
its utility connections, disconnected the home's skirting, attached it to a tractor trailer,
and drove it away.a78 The landlord did all of this without an eviction order (the trial
to settle the rent dispute was coming up). 2 79 To make matters worse, the sheriffs
knew that the landlord did not have an eviction order.280 By the time the Soldals got
their home back, it was badly damaged, and they brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging a violation of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
28 282Amendments. 281 The District Court found that there was no state action. The
Court of Appeals reversed on that issue, but somehow found that there was no
seizure.
283
The Supreme Court had little difficulty finding that the government had seized
the trailer home. 284  The Court applied the Jacobsen "meaningful interference"
definition2M and found a pretty clear case of a meaningful interference: "As a result
of the state action in this case, the Soldal's domicile was not only seized, it literally
was carried away, giving new meaning to the term, 'mobile home."' 2 86 The Court
remanded and stated that the Soldals had made a complaint alleging a violation of
their rights under the color of law.287 Although not a criminal case, Soldal serves as
an example of a seizure without a search that clearly would require probable cause at
inception if done in a criminal context. To relate this to Terry, this action was the
equivalent of an arrest.
As a final matter, Place, Van Leeuwen, and Jacobsen can quickly be fit into our
matrix. Remember that in Place, the Court found that the agents had seized the
items, that there was reasonable suspicion at inception, but that the agents exceeded
the scope authorized under reasonable suspicion seizures.288 As a result, Place serves
277. 506 U.S. 56(1992).
278. Id. at 58-59.
279. Id. at 56.
280. Id.
281. Id at59.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 59-60.
284. Id. at 72.
285. While the Court cited to this definition, it also noted that the Jacobsen court actually
applied Place reasoning in its decision: "[T]he Court in Jacobsen did not put an end to its inquiry...
Instead, adhering to the teachings of United States v. Place... it went on to determine whether the
invasion ...was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Soldal, 506 U.S. at 63 (citations
omitted). Like Hicks, this case does not do too much to substantively advance either model, but does
provide a useful factual benchmark for the Place model.
286. Id. at 61.
287. Id at 72.
288. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 709-10 (1983).
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as an example of facts that satisfy the definition of seizure, and facts that require
reasonable suspicion at inception. In addition, Place shows that when the
government exceeds the scope of a reasonable suspicion seizure, the government now
needs probable cause. Next, in Van Leeuwen, the Court found that the government
had seized the mail, that there was reasonable suspicion at inception, and that the
government did not exceed the scope authorized by reasonable suspicion seizures.
289
Therefore, Van Leeuwen serves as an example of facts that satisfy the definition of
seizure and facts that require reasonable suspicion at inception.29 ° Finally, remember
that in Jacobsen, the Court found the government's initial actions were a seizure, and
the government actually had probable cause at inception (the Court did not need to
reach scope limitation issues). Probable cause is greater than reasonable suspicion,
so the government also satisfied reasonable suspicion. Therefore, Jacobsen serves as
an example of facts that satisfy the definition of seizure and facts that require at least a
reasonable suspicion at inception.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should acknowledge the confusion among the lower federal
courts on "pure" seizure doctrine and resolve this issue by deciding that the Place
model is the correct approach for seizure analysis. The Terry Court decided that the
Constitution allowed the government to seize persons with less than probable cause,
but only in limited circumstances, and with judicial oversight. This article
demonstrates that the Place model is derived from and consistent with Terry, the
foundational case for reasonable suspicion seizures. The Place model is also
consistent with the holdings of other existing Supreme Court jurisprudence on pure
property seizures (to include the actual analysis within Jacobsen), and parallels
traditional search analysis.
The Jacobsen model, however, is not consistent with Terry or traditional search
analysis; in fact, the Jacobsen Court actually followed the Place model, making the
Jacobsen definition and the model that results merely dicta. The Jacobsen model is
essentially an "all or nothing" approach that converts the definition of "seizure" to a
term of art and chokes off the useful range of reasonable suspicion seizures.
Additionally, the Jacobsen model, both in theory and in practice, places a broad range
of government investigative activity beyond judicial scrutiny.
In contrast, the Place model provides the government with the ability to
investigate criminal activity while not placing a broad range of police misconduct
beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the Place model fully
respects a person's right to exercise dominion and control over her property, free from
claims of superior right by others, including the government. Under the Place model,
289. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970).
290. Id. at 252.
291. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 110, 121-22 (1984).
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if the police want to seize a package of mail without probable cause, the police can.
All that is required is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before they do so.
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APPENDix A. GRAPHicAL CoMPARsoN OF THE MODELS
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